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The internationalization of financial markets has contributed to the growing 
interdependence  of  the  world’s  economies. In  particular,  policy  or other 
shocks that affect domestic  savings-investment balances may  set in motion 
large  international  capital  flows.  Accordingly,  policymakers  increasingly 
recognize  that  their  macroeconomic  policies  may  have  important interna- 
tional ramifications. 
Tax rules, especially those regarding the taxation of capital income, poten- 
tially have powerful effects on savings-investment balances and, therefore, on 
external current accounts and international capital flows. Moreover, the inte- 
gration of financial markets has made tax rules more powerful in affecting the 
global allocation of investment and savings, thereby potentially distorting the 
worldwide allocation of resources. Thus, with the capital markets of the major 
industrial countries now  much more integrated,  changes in the structure of 
capital income  taxes  in one country can have major  implications  for other 
countries by  affecting international capital flows and global efficiency. This 
raises important issues of  surveillance  and coordination  in an  international 
context (see Tanzi and Bovenberg 1988). Nevertheless, with only a few recent 
exceptions (see Alworth and Fritz 1988; Fukao and Hanazaki 1987; Sinn 1987; 
Tanzi 1988; Sorenson 1987; and Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz 1984, 1987), the 
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international implications of domestic tax rules have received relatively little 
attention. 
This study explores how tax incentives for investment and savings affect 
international capital flows as well as national and global welfare. It measures 
the incentive effects of  capital income taxation by  using the concept of  the 
tax wedge, which has been developed in the academic literature (see, e.g., 
King and Fullerton 1984; Auerbach 1983; and Boadway 1985). Most studies 
using this concept have applied it only to investments financed domestically. 
A  major  purpose of  this  study  is  to  extend  the  methodology  to  analyze 
cross-border investments. This paper also presents some results on how the 
tax  systems in Japan and the United States have  interacted over the period 
1980-87  in  a  manner  that  could  affect  bilateral  capital  flows  and  the 
efficiency with which resources are allocated between them. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 8.1 discusses the scope of the 
study. Section 8.2 introduces the concept of  the tax  wedge  and  describes 
how  it  can  be  used  to  measure  the  incentive  effects  of  capital  income 
taxation,  both  in  closed  and  in  open  economies.  Section 8.3 develops a 
methodology  for  summarizing the  effects  of  capital  income  taxation  on 
international capital flows and welfare. Section 8.4 presents the information 
on tax parameters and the economic environment needed for the application 
of the methodology to Japan and the United States and briefly discusses the 
major tax reforms in recent years in the two countries. Section 8.5 applies 
the methodology to Japanese and U.S. data for the years  1980, 1984, and 
1987, in order to highlight the major tax reforms, and interprets the results. 
Finally, the concluding section relates the results to the observed movements 
in savings and investment balances in Japan and the United States and briefly 
examines the case for coordinating tax policy internationally. 
8.1  The Scope of the Study 
This  study  focuses  on  portfolio  rather  than  direct  investment for  two 
reasons. First, portfolio investment can be expected to be more sensitive to 
after-tax rates of  return  than  direct  investment; the latter investments are 
undertaken for reasons other than temporary higher rates of return, such as 
avoiding protectionist barriers or  entering a market.  Second,  the  share of 
portfolio investment in private capital flows has increased in recent years, in 
particular, during the  1980s. Tables 8.1 and  8.2  show the composition of 
private  capital  flows  from  and  to  the  United  States  during  the  period 
1980-87.  In  Japan,  developments  in  long-term  capital  flows  are  almost 
entirely determined by  movements in portfolio investment (fig. 8.1). 
This study does not explicitly consider the role of intermediaries, although 
tables 8.1-8.3  reveal their importance. Japanese savers in particular show a 
marked preference for saving through intermediaries (table 8.3). Neverthe- 
less,  some of  the study’s results will continue to hold,  even  if  funds are Table 8.1  The United States: Private Capital Flows, 1980-87  (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
U.S. private investment aboarda 




U.S. nonbanking concerns 
U.S. claims on unaffiliated foreigners reported by 
U.S. claims reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere 
Direct investments in the United States 
U.S.  securities 
Foreign private investment in the United Statesb 
Bonds 
U.S. Treasury securities 
Corporate and other bonds 
Corporate stocks 
U.S. nonbanking concerns 
U.S.  liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners reported by 

















104,516  95,304 
12,973  -20,596 
720  12,100 
2,330  10,890 
-  1,610  1,210 
1,181  -7,270 
89,622  1  11,070 
73,503  100,672 
25,668  15,963 
3,363  25,156 
3,541  13,268 
2,392  7,253 
1,149  6,015 
-  178  11,888 
180  -3,074 
44,292  62,627 
44,265 













































-  1,566 
42,318 
113,891  100,234 
29,312  49,318 
20,385  13,530 
8,782  9,240 
11,603  4,290 
4,219  -3,145 
59,975  40,530 
240,564  153,985 
35,799  41,513 
110,482  22,482 
67,503  15,761 
7,862  -  13,108 
59,641  28,869 
42,979  6,721 
-  2,833  2,212 
97,116  87,778 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of  Current Business. 
a Changes (including valuation changes) in the year-end balance of U.S. private assets abroad. 
Changes (including valuation changes) in the year-end balance of foreign nonofficial assets in the United States. Table 8.2  The United States: Private Capital Flows, 1980-87  (%) 
1980-87 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  Average 
U.  S . private investment abroad”  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Direct investments abroad  33.0  12.4  -21.6  -1.2  27.3  43.4  25.7  49.2  21 .o 
Foreign securities  7.0  .7  12.7  18.9  33.9  54.9  17.9  13.5  19.9 
Bonds  1.8  2.2  11.4  2.2  26.4  25.9  7.7  9.2  10.9 
Corporate stocks  5.2  -  1.5  1.3  16.7  7.5  29.0  10.2  4.3  9.1 
U.S. claims on unaffiliated foreigners reported by 
U.S. nonbanking concerns  3.8  1.1  -7.6  14.8  -32.4  -2.3  3.7  -3.1  -  2.8 
U.S. claims reported by  U.S. banks, not included elsewhere  56.1  85.7  116.5  67.6  71.1  4.0  52.7  40.4  61.8 
Direct investments in the United States  41.7  34.9  15.9  13.6  26.7  12.1  14.9  27.0  23.3 
U.S. securities  25.4  4.6  25.0  31.8  36.6  63.2  45.9  14.6  30.9 
Bonds  1.7  4.8  13.2  9.7  38.4  45.5  28.1  10.2  19.0 
U  .S  . Treasury securities  2.8  3.3  7.2  8.9  23.6  15.4  3.3  -8.3  7.0 
Corporate stocks  23.7  -  .2  11.8  22.1  -1.8  17.6  17.9  4.4  11.9 
Foreign private investment in the United Statesb  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Corporate and other bonds  -  1.1  1.6  6.0  .8  14.8  30.1  24.8  18.7  12.0 
U.S. nonbanking concerns  17.2  .2  -3.1  -  .7  4.0  -.9  -1.2  1.4  2.1 
U.S. liabilities reported by  U.S. banks, not included elsewhere  15.7  60.3  62.2  55.3  32.8  25.6  40.4  57.0  43.7 
U.S. liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners reported by 
Source: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Survey of  Current Business. 
a Changes (including valuation changes) in the year-end balance of  U.S. private assets abroad. 
Changes (including valuation changes) in the year-end balance of foreign nonofficial assets in the United States. 287  Tax  Incentives and International Capital Flows 
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Table 8.3  Financial Assets of Households (a) 
Japan  1984  United States 1983 
Currency and sight deposit  11.0 
Time deposit  59.7 
Insurance and pension  15.7 
Securities (stocks and bonds)  13.1 
(Stocks)  (1.5) 







Source: Tachibanaki (1988, 23). 
channeled  through  intermediaries,  if  these  institutions  are  competitive, 
earning no monopoly profits at the margin. An explicit analysis of the role of 
intermediaries would require a separate study. 
This study examines  corporate investments that relate to machinery. Because 
tax treatments of investments in structures or noncorporate residential assets, 
especially housing, differ from those of corporate investments in machinery, 
some modification would be necessary to apply the formulas developed in the 
study to these investments. 
Finally,  table  8.1  reveals  that  part  of  portfolio  investments  were  in 
government securities. Although we do not explicitly consider investments in 
government securities, our calculations can be readily used to infer the effect of 
taxes on after-tax rates of  return to savers, as indicated in section 8.6.1 
8.2  Capital Income Taxation in Closed and Open Economies 
After introducing the concept of the tax wedge, this section analyzes how 
capital income taxes influence capital accumulation  and welfare in a closed 
economy.  It then  turns  to  an  open  economy  that  is  integrated  in  world 288  A. L. BovenbergIK. AnderssodK. AramakiIS. K. Chand 
financial  markets.  While  the  initial  discussion  considers  the  small  open 
economy, which  is conceptually  the easiest to handle,  the methodology  of 
the  paper  is  developed  for the  larger  open  economy,  whose  policies  may 
influence world market conditions. 
8.2.1  The Tax Wedge Concept 
An investment project  involves a saver sacrificing consumption today by 
transferring resources to the project.  At  some point in the future, the  saver 
earns  a  return  on  the  investment.  If  taxes  are  absent,  the  saver's  return 
coincides with  the rate of return earned on the  investment.  Capital income 
taxes, however,  constitute a wedge between the pretax return on investment 
and the after-tax return on savings. 
The concept of the tax wedge can be explained' by defining three rates of 
return:  the required before-tax  return on investment p, the market return  r, 
and the after-tax return  on savings s. All these returns are measured in real 
terms. 
The market  return  r represents the price of funds on capital markets and 
provides the link between the firm carrying out the investment and the saver 
providing the financing.  It is the return that the firm pays to the saver after it 
has paid  corporate tax but before the  saver has met personal  tax liabilities. 
The funds may be  in the form of either debt or equity. In the case of debt 
finance, the  market  return  corresponds  to the  real  interest rate. For equity 
financing,  it  amounts  to  the  real  return  on  equity  (including  retained 
earnings) before personal taxes. 
The minimum rate of  return that the firm must earn before taxes in order 
to be able to pay any taxes due and a market rate of return r is denoted by p. 
This required before-tax rate of return is the conventional user cost of capital 
measured net of depreciation. The relation between p  and r depends both on 
macroeconomic  variables,  such as the inflation rate, and on tax provisions, 
for example, regarding depreciation allowances,  investment grants,  and the 
deductibility of interest expenses. The cost of capital function, which links p 
to r, summarizes these various factors: 
(1)  c(r)  = p. 
The cost  of  capital  function  generally  depends  on  the  type  of  asset  and 
industry  as  well  as  on  the  form  of  financing  because  the  tax  system 
typically  discriminates  between  different  assets,  industries,  and  types  of 
financing. 
The after-tax return  function  formalizes  the relation between the market 
rate and the after-tax return received by the saver: 
d(r)  = s. 
This relation  is typically  affected by  the inflation  rate and the personal  tax 
treatment  of  the  saver.  Furthermore, it  generally  depends  on  whether  the 289  Tax  Incentives and International Capital Flows 
saver provides funds directly or  through an intermediary, such as a bank, 
pension fund, or life insurance company, and on whether the funds are in the 
form of debt or equity. 
The total  tax  wedge  t  is defined as the difference between the required 
pretax rate of return and the posttax return received by the saver: 
(3)  t=p-s. 
One  can  interpret  the  tax  wedge  as  the  equivalent  of  a  wealth  tax  rate 
because it is the difference between two rates of  return on an asset.* 
8.2.2  The Closed Economy 
The  extensive literature on  the  effects of  capital  income taxation in  a 
closed  economy  summarizes  the  disincentive  effects  of  capital  income 
taxation by  the total tax wedge t. King and Fullerton (1984), for example, 
calculated these tax wedges for eighty-one different hypothetical investment 
projects in each of the following four countries: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of  Germany, and  Sweden. The eighty-one 
projects combine three types of  assets (machinery, buildings, and invento- 
ries), three types of  industries (manufacturing, commerce, and other), three 
types of financing (debt, retained earnings, and new share issues), and three 
types  of  owners  (households,  tax-exempt  institutions,  and  insurance 
companies).  The  study  did  not  consider  international  capital  flows. 
Accordingly, firms are assumed to finance their investments by raising funds 
from savers who reside domestically. 
Savings and Investment 
Figure 8.2 illustrates how the total tax wedge t affects the capital market 
equilibrium in a closed economy setting. The investment schedule relates the 
flow of investment to p.  According to the neoclassical theory of  investment 
behavior, which we shall assume here, firms carry out investments until the 
Fig. 8.2  Tax wedge and welfare costs: the closed economy case 290  A. L. BovenberglK. AnderssodK. Aramaki/S.  K. Chand 
before-tax return (i.e., the internal rate of return) equals the required rate of 
return p. Accordingly, in the absence of externalities, the investment schedule 
represents  the  marginal  product  of  investment  at  different  levels  of 
investment.  Its  downward  slope reflects  diminishing marginal  returns  on 
in~estment.~  The slope of  the investment  curve is  inversely  related  to the 
elasticity of investment with respect to the required return p. 
The savings schedule relates the flow of  savings to the after-tax return s. 
The upward  slope of  the savings schedule reflects  a positive  compensated 
savings elasticity. The smaller the slope is, the larger the savings elasticity 
becomes. 
If  taxes are absent and intermediation  costs are ignored, both the before- 
and after-tax returns coincide with the market return: 
(4)  r=s=p, 
and equilibrium in figure 8.2 is found at the point A  where the savings and 
investment schedules intersect. 
Taxes drive a wedge between the before- and the after-tax returns. Given 
the investment and savings elasticities, the total tax wedge t contains enough 
information  to  find  the  effects  of  capital  income  taxes  on  savings  and 
investment. To  illustrate,  in figure 8.2 the tax wedge is given by the distance 
BC. Thus, in this  particular case, the wedge is positive,  and the  required 
before-tax return on investment  exceeds the after-tax return received by the 
saver.4 This  positive  wedge  reduces  both  investment  and  savings  by  the 
distance Z(O)Z(l).  The more elastic savings and investment are, the flatter the 
curves become, and the  more powerful  a  given  tax  wedge is  in  affecting 
savings and investment. 
Welfare 
Once  the  effects  of  the  tax  wedge  on  savings  and  investment  are 
determined, the  welfare  effects in  a  closed  economy can  more easily  be 
determined. On the  savings  side,  households  are  assumed  to equate  the 
after-tax  return  on  their  marginal  savings  s to  the  opportunity  cost  of 
delaying  consumption,  which  measures  the  social  costs  of  financing  the 
in~estment.~  On the investment side, firms equate the required returnp to the 
before-tax return on marginal investment. This latter return includes both the 
return received by savers and the tax revenues collected by the government. 
Accordingly,  in the absence of  externalities, p  measures the social benejts 
that  a  marginal  investment  earns  for  society  as  a  whole.6 The  total  tax 
wedge, therefore, captures  the difference between the social benefits p  and 
the social costs s associated  with a marginal  investment. In figure 8.2, the 
tax  wedge reduces  capital  accumulation by  Z(O)Z(l).  The social benefits of 
these crowded-out units, as measured by the before-tax return p,  exceed their 
social  costs,  as measured  by  the  after-tax  return  s.  Accordingly,  the  tax 
wedge  reduces  welfare  by  the  triangle  ABC.  If  investment  and  savings 291  Tax  Incentives and  International Capital Flows 
become more sensitive to rates of  return,  a given tax wedge implies larger 
welfare losses. 
The total tax wedge in the closed economy must be divided into two parts 
in order to find the effect of capital income taxes on the market return r. The 
first part  is the corporate tax wedge  t, between the before-tax  and market 
returns: 
(5)  t, = p - r. 
The second wedge, which is called the personal tax wedge  rp,  measures the 
effect of  personal taxes and amounts to the gap between the market return 
and the after-tax return received by the saver: 
(6)  tp = r -  s. 
In a closed economy, if  the size of the total tax wedge is kept unchanged, 
the personal-corporate split affects neither capital accumulation nor welfare. 
In these circumstances, the composition of  the tax wedge affects only the 
market return. If the personal tax wedge is reduced to zero and the corporate 
tax wedge is increased so as to account for the whole predetermined wedge 
between p and s, there would be pressure on investment to decline. Thus, the 
market rate would be reduced,  while savings would be stimulated, further 
reducing the market rate. It can be readily demonstrated that the market rate 
would decline by just the amount needed to offset the effects of the changing 
tax factors on the after-tax return to savings and the costs of investment. It is 
only by changing the size of the total tax wedge that savings and investment 
are modified. If  the share of  the personal tax wedge in the total tax wedge 
becomes larger, the market rate falls less. The market return rises if the share 
of the personal tax wedge in the total tax wedge becomes large enough. 
8.2.3  The Open Economy 
Savings, Investment, and Capital Flows 
In an open economy, domestic savings and domestic investment do not 
necessarily balance because of  the possibility of  nonzero net  capital flows 
with the rest of  the world. The existence of international capital markets has 
important  implications  for  the  analysis  of  capital  income  taxation.  In 
particular,  it  becomes  important  to  distinguish  between  savings  and 
investment incentives and to attend to the composition of the tax wedge. 
Figure  8.3 illustrates the  differential effects  of  savings and  investment 
incentives in the case of a small open economy in which international capital 
markets fix the domestic market return at the rate of return on world capital 
markets r*.7 If  taxes are absent, both the before-tax return on investment and 
the after-tax return on savings equal the return on world markets: 
(7)  p  = s  = r*. 292  A. L. BovenbergIK. AnderssodK.  AramakYS.  K. Chand 
Fig. 8.3  Tax wedge and welfare costs: the small open economy case 
In the case depicted in figure 8.3,  investment exceeds savings by the distance 
Z(O)S(O)  if domestic returns equal the world rate of return.  Accordingly, the 
economy runs a current account deficit of that magnitude.' 
The introduction of capital income taxes affects investment,  savings, and 
capital flows.  Unlike in the closed economy,  where the total wedge affects 
both savings and investment,  in the small open economy  the corporate  tax 
component  of  the  wedge  affects  only  investment,  while  the  personal  tax 
component affects only savings. 
In figure 8.3, a corporate tax wedge of the size AB reduces investment by 
the distance  Z(O)Z(  1) but  fails to affect domestic  savings.  Accordingly,  the 
current  account  deficit  falls  by  Z(O)Z(l).  It  is of  interest  that the  infinitely 
elastic supply of  world savings implicit in the fixed market return  r*  makes 
the  corporate  tax  wedge  more  powerful  in  affecting  domestic  investment 
than in a closed economy. This is because the market rate would decline in a 
closed economy, which would cushion the effect of raising the corporate tax 
component. 
The personal tax wedge does not affect domestic investment but reduces 
domestic  savings  and, therefore,  weakens  the  external  current  account.  In 
figure 8.3, for example, a personal tax wedge of the magnitude DE widens 
the current  account  deficit  by  the distance  S(O)S(l).  As  with  the effect  of 
corporate  taxes  on  investment,  the  more  open  the  economy,  the  more 
powerful the effects of the personal tax wedge on domestic savings. 
National  Welfare Effects 
The openness  of  the  economy  also has  important consequences  for the 
effects  of  capital  income  taxation  on  national  welfare.  In  the  small  open 
economy in figure 8.3, the rate of return on world markets r*  corresponds to 
the  national  cost  of  financing  a  marginal  investment.'  The  required 
before-tax  rate  of  return  measures  the  national  benefits  associated  with  a 
marginal  investment  (see  subsec.  8.2.2).  Accordingly,  the  corporate  tax 293  Tax  Incentives and International Capital Flows 
wedge,  which  is  the  difference  between  the  before-tax  and  the  market 
returns,  measures the  gap  between the  national benefits  and  the  national 
costs associated with marginal investment. In figure 8.3, the corporate tax 
wedge AB  reduces national welfare by  the triangle ABC  because this tax 
wedge crowds out the investment units Z(O)I( 1) for which national benefits 
exceed national costs. A given corporate tax wedge imposes larger national 
welfare losses in an open economy than it does in a closed economy owing 
to its greater effect on investment. 
The  personal  tax  wedge  corresponds to  the  gap  between  the  national 
benefits and costs associated with a marginal unit of  domestic savings. In 
figure 8.3, a personal tax wedge of  the size DE reduces national welfare by 
the triangle DEF. In a closed economy, a subsidy at the corporate level could 
have  mitigated  the  welfare losses.  In  particular,  a  negative corporate tax 
wedge equal in absolute value to the personal tax wedge would have avoided 
the  welfare  losses  altogether. In  an  open  economy,  in  contrast,  such  an 
investment subsidy only adds welfare costs at the investment side to those 
imposed  by  the  savings tax.  For  example,  in  figure  8.3, the  investment 
subsidy implicit in the negative corporate tax wedge  -GH  =  -DE  adds 
welfare losses  amounting to  the  triangle  CGH to  the  welfare  costs  cor- 
responding to the area DEF imposed by  the taxation of  savings.  lo 
World Welfare Efsects 
This  subsection  examines  how  international  differences  in  investment 
incentives affect global efficiency. Instead of a small open economy, we now 
consider  a  hypothetical world  or  closed economy  consisting of  only  the 
United States and Japan. In figure 8.4, the distance between the two vertical 
\ 
A  k(0)  tlll  B 
Fig. 8.4  Corporate tax wedges and the international allocation of the 
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axes measures the size of the world capital stock, which is assumed to be fixed 
so as to focus on the international allocation of capital."  The solid downward and 
upward sloping lines represent the marginal product curves in, respectively, the 
United States and Japan. The schedule for the United States is measured from the 
left axis and that in Japan from the right axis. If taxes and externalities are absent, 
these curves coincide with the capital demand curves as a function of the cost of 
funds.  In  that  case,  the  intersection of  the  two  solid  lines C represents  the 
equilibrium in world capital markets. At this nontax equilibrium, the return on 
world markets amounts to r(0)  while a part AK(0)  of the world capital stock is 
located in the United States. 
If  the United States provides an investment incentive corresponding  to a 
negative  corporate  tax  wedge equal in  absolute  value  to  -p = DE, the 
capital demand curve in the United  States shifts upward to the dotted line. 
As a consequence,  the return on world markets rises to r( 1) and a part of  the 
world capital stock corresponding to K(  l)K(O) gradually moves from Japan 
to the United States. During the transition to this new long-run equilibrium, 
net  investment in  the United  States rises relative  to that in  Japan, and  the 
external current account of the United States weakens. 
Conceptually, differential investment incentives distort the global playing 
field and, if  externalities are absent, harm global welfare.  With differential 
investment incentives,  equal after-tax returns on assets located  in different 
countries  correspond  to  different  before-tax  returns  on those  assets. This 
violates  a  necessary  condition  for  efficiency  in  the  allocation  of  capital, 
namely,  that before-tax returns on different assets should be equal. Overall 
welfare  could be raised  by  relocating  capital  from countries  with  a lower 
before-tax return to those with higher returns. For example, in figure 8.4, the 
differential investment incentive corresponding to DE reduces world welfare 
by  the  triangle DCE because  the capital K(O)K(l)  earns a lower before-tax 
return in the United  States than it could earn in Japan. 
8.3  Methodology 
In this section, the tax wedge concept is extended to cross-border portfolio 
investments  by  allowing  foreign residents  to finance  domestic  investments 
and  domestic  residents  to  finance  foreign  investments.  In  particular,  tax 
wedges are computed for all host-residence  (or saver-investment) combina- 
tions. A residence country is characterized by a typical saver, while a typical 
investment represents the host country. Regarding the financing instruments, 
the study  distinguishes  between debt and equity finance. New  share issues 
and retained earnings are assumed to account for fixed proportions  of  total 
equity financing. 
The  study  disaggregates  the  total  tax  wedge  for  each  host-residence 
combination  into  three  separate  wedges  corresponding  to,  respectively, 
corporate  taxes  (f,),  withholding  taxes  (fJ,  and  residence  taxes  (t,.)  (fig. 




Figure 8.5  Tax wedge components 
wedge  (t,). Subsection 8.3.1 discusses the  measurement of  the corporate tax 
wedge.  Subsection 8.3.2 defines international differences in investment incen- 
tives and explores how differential corporate tax wedges relate to these differ- 
ences.  It  shows  that  the  residence  principle  cannot  be  assumed,  therefore 
precluding the easier route considered in the preceding section whereby invest- 
ment incentives would be  identified with corporate tax wedges. The effects of 
investment incentives on international capital flows and  global efficiency are 
analyzed in subsection 8.3.3. Subsection 8.3.4 defines international differences 
in  savings incentives,  and  subsection  8.3.5 then  explores  the  corresponding 
effects of savings incentives. Subsection 8.3.6 defines the host tax wedge (th)  as 
the  sum of  the corporate  and  withholding tax  wedges and  explores how  the 
host-residence split affects national welfare. The appendix contains the mathe- 
matical expressions for the tax wedges and their components for, respectively, 
debt- and equity-financed investments. 
8.3.1  Corporate Tax Wedges 
To compute the  corporate  tax  wedge, two assumptions  are made.  First, 
only  the host  country collects corporate  taxes.  Second, corporate taxes  do 
not  discriminate  between  domestic  and  foreign  savers.  Accordingly,  the 
corporate tax rate on a given investment is the same irrespective of whether 
the saver financing the investment is residing abroad or domestically. 296  A. L. BovenberdK. AnderssodK. AramakilS. K. Chand 
The two assumptions are generally met for portfolio investments. Even in 
the case of direct investments,  the host country  tax  system may  determine 
the effective corporate tax wedge on marginal investments. This is the case, 
for example, if  the residence  country  has  a territorial  system of  corporate 
taxation or if firms are in an overall excess credit position under a system of 
worldwide  taxation.  Moreover,  residence  countries  typically  tax  income 
from  subsidiaries  only  on repatriation,  unless  it  is earned  in  a tax  haven. 
Under  these  circumstances,  host  taxes  determine  marginal  investment  in- 
centives  if  firms,  at  the  margin,  finance  foreign  investment  by  retained 
earnings,  which appears to be  a dominant  form of marginal  financing  (see 
Hartman 1985; and Sinn 1987). 
8.3.2  The Measurement of Investment Incentives 
Section 8.2 used the corporate tax wedge to measure the effect of capital 
income  taxation  on  investment  incentives  in a  small  open economy.  This 
procedure, which greatly simplifies the analysis, is valid only if  international 
capital markets equalize market returns across different jurisdictions.  This, in 
turn,  requires  two  assumptions.  First,  assets  located  in  different  countries 
should be  perfect  substitutes in demand  so that savers residing  in  a given 
country require the same after-tax return s on all their assets. Second, personal 
taxes should be collected on the basis of the residence principle. According to 
this principle, residence governments tax real capital income (after corporate 
tax) at a personal tax rate that does not depend on the country where the capital 
income originates. Only if this principle holds does the equalization of after-tax 
returns by savers correspond to the same market returns (fig. 8.6). 
In practice,  the  residence  principle  may  fail  to  hold  for at  least  three 
reasons. l3 First, even if  residence countries apply the residence principle to 
nominal  returns,  real  returns  are  likely to  be  taxed  differently  if  inflation 
rates  diverge  between  host  countries.  In  particular,  financial  instruments 
denominated in the currency of low-inflation countries tend to benefit from a 
preferential  tax  treatment  of  capital  gains  because  these  securities  earn  a 
large part of their returns in the form of an exchange rate appreciation (i.e., 
capital gains),  which  are typically  taxed  at lower rates (see, e.g., Gordon 
1986; and Sorenson  1986). 
Second, withholding taxes on income earned by  nonresidents violate the 
residence  principle  if  savers  do  not  have  sufficient  residence  liabilities 
against which to credit the foreign withholding taxes. This may be the case if 
they save through tax-exempt institutions. l4 
A  third  reason  why  the  residence  principle  may  fail  concerns  the 
integration of corporate and personal taxation. Under the numerous methods 
of  integration, residence countries typically impose different tax rates at the 
personal  level  depending  on  whether  corporate  tax  has  been  levied 
domestically or abroad (see Sat0 and Bird  1975). Moreover, host countries 
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Figure 8.6  The residence principle 
For these reasons, the residence principle, although it would have simplified 
the analysis,  will  not  be  adopted here.  As  a consequence,  differences in 
investment incentives cannot be measured simply as differences in corporate 
tax wedges. Instead, the incentives are measured by  comparing, for a given 
saver, the total tax wedges on investments located in different host countries, 
as illustrated in figure 8.7. 
Investment incentives may differ for savers residing in different countries 
if the residence principle does not hold. In that case, the tax systems provide 
incentives for tax  arbitrage between savers residing in different countries. 
However,  savers do not fully exploit these arbitrage opportunities because 
assets  located  in  different  countries-although  easily  substitutable-are 
assumed not to be perfect substitutes in demand.I5 
8.3.3  The Effect of Investment Incentives on International Capital Flows 
and Global Efficiency 
The measure of  investment incentives developed here summarizes how 
personal  and corporate income taxes interact to affect international capital 
flows. If, for example, tax wedges on assets located in country A exceed 
those on assets in country B, and if  all other conditions are equal, the tax 
system provides incentives for capital flows from A to B.16 
Such differences indicate how  the interaction of  capital income taxes in 
various countries distorts the international allocation of capital by  violating 298  A. L. BovenbergIK. AnderssodK. AramakiIS. K. Chand 
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Figure 8.7  The measurement of investment incentives 
what may be stated as the principle of  capital export neutrality.  According 
to this  principle,  savers should face the  same tax  rate on assets located in 
different  countries  (in  the  absence  of  externalities)  so that  tax  systems  do 
not  interfere  with  an  efficient  global  allocation  of  capital.  The principle 
requires  that  investors  be  indifferent  between  assets  located  in  different 
countries on both  a before-tax and an after-tax basis.  If  the intercountry tax 
wedges differ, equal after-tax returns  will fail to yield  the equal before-tax 
returns  that  are  required  for an  efficient  allocation  of  capital.  Figure  8.7 
illustrates that a higher tax  wedge  on assets in  B compared  with  that in A 
causes the before-tax  return  in  B to rise  above  that  in  A. Accordingly,  in 
the  absence  of  externalities,  moving  capital  from  A  to  B  would  raise 
overall welfare. 
8.3.4  The Measurement of Savings Incentives 
International differences in saving incentives are measured by comparing, 
for  a  given  asset,  the  total  tax  wedges  on  savers  residing  in  different 
countries  (fig.  8.8). In  this  paper,  these  differences  are  entirely  due  to 
differences in personal tax treatment as a consequence of the assumption (see 
subsec.  8.3.1) that  the  corporate  tax  rate  on  a  given  asset  is  the  same 
whether it is financed abroad or domestically. 299  Tax  Incentives and International Capital Flows 
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Figure 8.8  The measurement of savings incentives 
8.3.5  The Effect of Savings Incentives on International 
Capital Flows and Global Efficiency 
International differences in savings incentives, as measured by differences 
in the tax wedges borne by savers in different countries, will, ceteris paribus, 
tend to be reflected in lower savings in countries where savers bear the higher 
tax  burden.  Accordingly,  these  differences  would  contribute  to  a  weaker 
current account position in those countries, thereby influencing international 
capital flows. 
Differences  in  savings  incentives  indicate  that  capital  income  taxes 
violate  the  so-called  principle  of  capital  import  neutrality  according  to 
which  the  tax  treatment  of  a  given  asset  should not  discriminate  between 
savers  residing  in  different  countries  (in  the  absence  of  externalities). 
Departures  from capital import neutrality are associated with  an inefficient 
allocation  of  global  savings  because  they  drive  a  wedge  between  the 
marginal rates of  time  preference of  different  savers.  Figure 8.8 illustrates 
that  the  cost  of  postponing  marginal  consumption  for  the  saver  residing 
in A who faces the lower tax burden exceeds that for the saver who resides 
in B. Thus, the welfare cost from the allocation of savings to meet a given 
overall  investment  level  would  have  been  lowered  if  the  less  heavily 
taxed saver were to save less and the more heavily taxed saver were to save 
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8.3.6  Host and Residence Tax Wedges: National Welfare Effects 
The personal tax wedge consists of two parts: the withholding tax wedge 
and the residence tax wedge. The residence country levies the residence tax 
wedge,  while  the  host  country  collects,  in  addition  to  the  corporate  tax 
wedge, the withholding tax wedge. Accordingly, the total host tax wedge is 
defined as the sum of the corporate and withholding tax wedges. The return 
after host taxes but before residence taxes is defined as r, (fig. 8.5). It is the 
return that the residence country collects from the host country and consists 
of  a part  received  by  the  private  saver  (the  after-tax  return  s)  and  a part 
collected by the residence government (the residence tax wedge tR). 
The host-residence split of the total tax wedge provides some insight into 
the effects of capital income taxation on national welfare. l7 In particular, the 
host  tax  wedge  captures  the  difference  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
national  return  on  a  marginal  investment,  which  is  measured  by  the 
before-tax returnp, and, on the other hand, the national costs associated with 
the financing of such an investment by foreign savings, which is represented 
by the return after host taxes.I8 Therefore, a positive host tax wedge implies 
that the host country gains from a marginal investment financed  by foreign 
savings. Similarly, the residence tax wedge measures, at the margin, the net 
national  benefit  of  financing  a  foreign  investment  by  domestic  savings 
because it corresponds to the difference between the return  after host taxes, 
which  measures the  national benefits,  and the  return after all taxes,  which 
represents the national costs of  marginal savings (see subsec. 8.2.2). 
8.4  Economic Environment and Tax Parameters: 
The United States and Japan 
This study computes tax wedges for the United States and Japan for  1980, 
1984, and 1987. Both the macroeconomic environment and tax provisions affect 
these  tax  wedges.  Subsection  8.4.1  discusses  how  this  study  derives  the 
numerical values for the macroeconomic variables in the three years studied. The 
tax provisions underlying the results are described in subsection 8.4.2. 
8.4.1  The Macroeconomic Environment 
The tax  wedge corresponding  to debt instruments can be expressed  as a 
function of  tax parameters  and of the  following  variables that describe  the 
economic  environment:  the  nominal  interest  rate  in  the  host  country,” 
expected  inflation  rates  in  the  host  and  residence  countries, and expected 
movements in nominal  exchange rates. In the case of  equity financing, the 
nominal  after-corporate-tax  return  (including  retained  earnings)  on  equity 
issued in the host country replaces the nominal interest rate as an element in 
the expressions for the tax wedges.” 
As  regards  exchange rate  expectations,  the  study  assumes  that  savers 
expect movements in nominal exchange rates to reflect inflation differentials. 301  Tax  Incentives and  International Capital Flows 
The expected rate of  inflation in the United States is derived from a survey 
conducted  by  Drexel  Burnham  Lambert  on  expected  inflation  ten  years 
ahead. The average of  the actual inflation rate in the next three years is used 
as a proxy for the expected inflation rate in Japan.2' 
The study does not assume that real interest rates are necessarily equalized 
among countries. Instead, it combines observed long-term nominal interest 
rates  with  expected  inflation  rates  to  find  real  interest  rates  in  the  two 
countries.22 Long-term interest rates are measured by  the rate of  return on 
government bonds.  The maturity  of  the bonds  is  ten  years  for the United 
States and seven years for Japan. 
This  paper  imposes  arbitrage  at  the  firm  level  to  find  the  return  on 
equity.23  In particular, it assumes that, for any investment project, the gap 
between the cost of equity financing and the cost of debt financing is fixed at 
5 percentage points. This gap is based on estimates for the costs of  equity 
financing  (after  corporate  tax)  during  the  1980s  that  are  contained  in 
Hatsopoulos and Brooks (1987). The estimates provided for the 1980s were 
averaged both over time and over Japan and the United States.24 
Various  other  studies  link  the  equity  return  to  the  return  on  debt  by 
imposing an arbitrage condition at the savers'  side so that  savers earn the 
same after-tax return on debt and equity.25 However, in an open economy 
framework, arbitrage conditions will generally differ for savers residing in 
different countries because the tax burden on debt relative to that on equity 
generally differs across countries. Thus, imposing arbitrage conditions for 
savers residing in different countries typically yields complete specialization 
in debt or equity, which is inconsistent with empirical observations.26 
8.4.2  Tax Parameters 
Information on key elements of the tax system required for the calculation 
of the tax wedges is presented in tables 8.4 and 8.5 for the United States and 
Japan, respectively. (The letters in the columns refer to the sources listed at 
the end of the tables.) 
The corporate tax parameters are based on a typical corporate investment 
in machinery. The tables reveal that the Japanese tax system has remained 
relatively stable during the 1980s. U.S. corporate tax provisions, in contrast, 
have  been  altered  several  times  during  this  period.  In  particular,  the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of  198  1 (ERTA) greatly liberalized depreciation 
schedules  and  provided  for  more  generous  investment  credits.  The  Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of  1982 (TEFRA) tightened some of 
these  investment  incentives.  The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986 reduced  the 
marginal  tax  rate  on  corporate  income  but  further  tightened  investment 
incentives by repealing the investment credit and making the tax provisions 
governing depreciation somewhat less generous. 
On the personal side, the United States gradually reduced the marginal tax 
rates on interest and dividend income during the  1980s. However, the Tax 302  A. L. BovenbergJK. AnderssodK. AramakiIS. K. Chand 
Table 8.4  The United States: Parameters (%) 
1980  I984  1987 
Tax parameters: 
Corporate tax rate 
Lifetime for depreciation purposes (in years)a 
Declining balance rate 
Investment grant (rate) 
Withholding tax rate on income to nonresidents: 
Interest income 
Dividend income 
Personal taxes on: 
Interest income 
Dividend income 
Exchange gains and losses 
Capital gains and losses 
at the personal level 
Portion of  foreign withholding tax refunded 
Nontax parameters: 
Fraction of new  shares in marginal equity financing 
Rate of economic depreciation 
Nominal interest rate 
Expected inflation rate 



















































AFullerton and Karayannis (1987). 
BCorker, Evans, Kenward (1988). 
'Hatsopoulos  and Brooks (1987). 
"Based  on  a  salvage  value  of  10  percent  of  purchase  value.  The  most  favorable  method 
permitted  by  the  tax  code has  been  used.  Accordingly,  if  after  a  certain  point  in  time  the 
straight-line method rather than declining balance yields a larger tax deduction, a switch to that 
method has been  assumed. 
'Assumed  to be the same as in 1980 
'Based  on a gap of 5 percentage points between the costs of equity and debt finance (see main 
text). The formulas for these costs of finance r;  are presented in the second rows in tables 8A.  1 
and 8A.2. 
Reform  Act  of  1986  raised  the  tax  rate  on  capital  gains.  The  average 
marginal tax rate on interest income earned by Japanese residents takes into 
account  various  methods  of  tax-exempt  savings,  such  as  the  Maru-yu 
 account^.'^ The marginal  tax rate on interest income received  from abroad 
exceeds the  marginal  rate on interest  income from  domestic investments 
because some of the tax-preferred  savings, such as postal savings, were not 
invested  abroad.  The  taxation  of  dividend  income  in  Japan  also  favors 
domestic  investment  because  some  tax  benefits,  such  as  a  10  percent 
dividend credit, do not apply to dividends from abroad. 
This study  focuses on portfolio rather  than  direct  investments  (see sec. 
8.1). Accordingly, residence countries neither credit nor levy corporate taxes 303  Tax Incentives and International Capital Flows 
Table 8.5  Japan: Parameters (%) 
1980  1984  1987 
Tax parameters: 
Corporate tax rate: 
Retained earnings 
Dividends 
Lifetime for tax purposes (in years)a 
Declining balance rate 
Investment grant (rate) 
Withholding tax rate on income to nonresidents: 
Interest income 
Dividend income 
Personal taxes on: 
Domestic interest income 
Domestic dividend income 
Foreign interest income 
Foreign dividend income 
Exchange gains and losses 
Capital gains and losses 
at personal level 
Portion of foreign withholding tax refunded 
Nontax parameters: 
Fraction of  new  shares in marginal equity financing 
Rate of  economic depreciation 
Nominal interest rate 
Expected inflation rate 



























































*Hatsopoulos and Brooks (1987). 
BKikutani and Tachibanaki (1987). 
'Shoven  and Tachibanaki (1985). 
"Based on a salvage value of  10 percent of purchase value. 
bAssumed to be the same as in  1980. 
'Based  on a gap of 5 percentage points between the costs of  equity and debt finance (see main 
text). The formulas for these costs of  finance ri are presented in the second rows in tables 8A. 1 
and 8A.2 
(see subsec.  8.3.1). However, savers are assumed to receive full credit for 
any  withholding  taxes  levied  by  the  host  government  on  their  personal 
income.'* 
8.5  Tax Wedges in the 1980s: The US.-Japan Case 
This section interprets the empirical estimates for the tax wedges in 1980, 
1984, and 1987 contained in tables 8.6-8.8.  The two panels in these tables 
contain  the  results  for,  respectively,  a  debt  and  an  equity-financed  in- 
vestment.  Tables 8.6 and 8.7 present  the tax wedges on assets located in, Table 8.6  Taxation of Assets Located in Japan, 1980-87  (in percentage points) 
Saver Residing in Japan 
Saver Residing  Saver Residing in  Relative to Saver Residing in 
in Japan  the United States  the United Statesa 















-  1.36 
-  2.12 
.76 
-  1.36 








-  .67 
-1.16 
.48 









-  .34 
-  .64 
.30 
-  .34 









-  2.12 
2.87 
.75 





















-  .64 
1.42 
.78 








-  2.12 
-2.12 
-2.12 
-  .92 
-1.19 
... 
-  .96 
-  .96 
-  .96 
-  .05 
-  .90 
-  1.54 
... 
-  1.54 
-  1.54 
-  .68 
-  .86 
-  .79 
-  .79 
-  .79 
-  .08 




-  .42 
-  .70 
... 
-  1.22 
-  1.22 
-  1.22 
-  .08 
-1.14 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a The column for each of  the three years is computed by  subtracting the results for a U.S. saver from those for a Japanese saver. Table 8.7  Taxation of  Assets Located in the United States, 1980-87  (in percentage points) 
Saver Residing in Japan 
Saver Residing  Saver Residing in  Relative to Saver Residing in 
in Japan  the United States  the United Statesa 




























-  6.55 
1.26 
-5.29 

































-  6.55 
3.23 
-3.32 








-  .61 
-2.49 
1.88 









-  1.99 
-  1.99 
-  1.99 
1.15 
-3.14 
-  .74 
-  .74 
-  .74 
.02 
-  .77 
... 
-  1.97 
... 
-  1.97 
-  1.97 
-1.97 
-  .61 
... 
-  .61 
-  .61 
.06 
-  .67 
-  1.06 
-  1.06 
-  1.06 
-  1.06 
-  1.02 
-  1.02 
-  1.02 
.05 
-  1.08 
... 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a The column for each of the three years is computed by subtracting the results for a U.S. saver from those for a Japanese saver. 306  A. L. BovenberglK. AnderssodK. AramakiIS. K. Chand 
Table 8.8  Taxation of Assets Located in Japan Relative to the Taxation of 
Assets Located in the United States, 1980-87  (in percentage points) 
~  ~ 
Saver Residing in 
Japan relative to 
Saver Residing  Saver Residing in  Saver Residing in 
in Japan  the United States  the United States" 



























4.62  1.33  3.06  4.20 
5.40  1.85  3.46  5.40 
-.78  -.52  -.39  -1.20 
4.62  1.33  3.06  4.20 
5.40  1.85  4.38  6.08 
-.78  -.52  -1.32  -1.88 
6.93  4.57  5.06  7.10 
6.96  4.61  4.83  6.96 
-.04  -.04  .23  .14 
6.93  4.57  5.06  7.10 
6.91  4.55  4.88  7.05 
.02  .02  .18  .06 
1.40 
1.85 
-  .45 
1.40 
2.27 








-  .I2 
-.I2 
-  2.07 
1.95 
... 
-  .21 
-  .21 
-  .21 
-  .08 
-.I3 
... 
.42  -.07 
...  ... 
.42  -.07 
.42  -.07 
-.68  -.42 
1.10  .35 
-.18  -.20 
-.18  -.20 
-.I8  -.20 
-.I4  -.I3 
-  .03  -  .07 
...  ,.. 
Source; Authors'  calculations. 
Note; This  table  is  computed  by  subtracting  the results  in table  8.7 from the corresponding 
results in table 8.6. 
"The column for each of the three years can be computed by  subtracting the results for a U.S. 
saver from those for a Japanese saver. 
respectively,  Japan and the United  States. The first three columns in tables 
8.6 and 8.7 show how a Japanese saver was taxed. The tax  treatment  of  a 
U.S. saver is presented in the next three columns. The last three columns are 
computed as the difference between  the column for the Japanese saver and 
the column for the U.S. saver. Thus, the last three columns in tables 8.6 and 
8.7 measure relative savings incentives because they reveal how, for a given 
asset, the tax  treatment  of  a Japanese saver differed  from that  of  a  saver 
residing  in  the  United  States  (see subsec.  8.3.4 and  fig.  8.8). Table  8.8 
measures how the tax  system may have affected  international  capital  flows 
through  its effect on investment incentives;  it compares, for a given  saver, 
the  tax  treatment  of  investments  in  Japan  with  that  of  investments  in  the 
United  States  (see subsec. 8.3.2 and  fig.  8.6). This table is computed by 
subtracting the results contained in table 8.7 from the corresponding results 
contained in table 8.6. 
In each column, the total tax burden  is broken  down in two ways. First, 
the total tax wedge is the sum of  the corporate tax wedge and the personal 
tax wedge. Second, the total tax  wedge consists of the host tax wedge and 307  Tax  Incentives and International Capital Flows 
the residence tax wedge. For investments financed by savers residing in the same 
country, the  distinction between  host  and  residence  tax  wedges  is  irrelevant 
because the host country and residence country are one and the same. For these 
local investments, the host tax wedge is given by the corporate tax wedge. 
The  disaggregation  of  the  total  tax  wedge  into  host  and  residence  tax 
wedges provides information on national welfare effects (see subsec. 8.3.6). 
Moreover, comparing the host tax wedge for a Japanese asset with that for a 
U.S. asset measures the investment incentive for a saver who does not pay 
any personal taxes except for those withheld abroad.  Savers pay  only these 
personal taxes if they are tax exempt or if  they evade taxes. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 8.5.1  analyzes 
tax  incentives for international  capital  flows by  investigating,  respectively, 
investment  and  savings  incentives.  How  capital  income  taxation  affects 
global efficiency by  distorting the international and intertemporal  allocation 
of  resources  is explored  in  subsection  8.5.2. Finally,  subsection  8.5.3 an- 
alyzes national welfare effects. 
8.5.1 
Investment Incentives 
Tax Incentives for International Capital Flows 
The positive numbers in (the first six columns of) the first rows of  the two 
panels in table  8.8 indicate that the  tax burden  on assets located  in Japan 
exceeded the tax burden on assets located in the United States. Accordingly, 
taxes encouraged capital flows from Japan to the United States by favoring 
investments in the United States. 
The breakdown over the corporate and personal tax wedges reveals which 
factors are behind the tax incentives for investments in the United States. For 
the  debt  case, the  corporate-personal  split  is  contained  in  the  second  and 
third  rows of the first panel  in table  8.8. These rows  show that the  larger 
investment incentives in the United States are entirely the consequence of a 
more favorable corporate  tax treatment  in the United  States, which can be 
explained  by  more  liberal  depreciation  rules,  more  generous  investment 
credits, and, for debt-financed investments,  a higher inflation rate that raises 
the value of the deductibility of nominal interest payments.29 
Unlike corporate taxes, personal taxes in both Japan and the United States 
discriminated against debt-financed investments in the United States for two 
A  major reason  is  the  relatively  low  expected  inflation  rate  in 
Japan.  Accordingly,  under  the  assumption  that  exchange  rates  reflected 
inflation  differentials,  the  yen  was  expected  to  appreciate  relative  to  the 
dollar.  Consequently, Japanese  assets yielded  part of  their expected returns 
to U.S. savers in capital gains, which the U.S. personal tax  system treated 
favorably  relative to nominal  interest income. In addition,  Japanese  savers 
could  not  deduct  the  expected  capital  losses  on  U.S.  assets  from  their 
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returns  on these  assets.  A  second  explanation  for the  higher  personal  tax 
wedge  on U.S.  assets  faced  by  Japanese  residents  is  that  some  of  the 
tax-sheltered forms of Japanese savings were not allowed to flow abroad (see 
subsec.  8.4.2). 
The movements of the relative investment incentives over time reveal that 
international differentials  in  investment  incentives  first rose  between  1980 
and 1984 and then fell in 1987. These developments were due mainly to tax 
policy in the United States, which first liberalized its investment incentives 
but later tightened them (see subsec.  8.4.2). 
In the case of debt financing, the  1984 increase in the favorable treatment 
of U.S.  investment is particularly dramatic when measured by the change in 
the relative host tax wedge contained in the fifth row of  table 8.8. When the 
United States repealed the withholding tax on interest income to foreigners 
in 1984, it became a more attractive investment location for those savers who 
could not fully credit the withholding tax against their residence tax liabilities. 
Savings Incentives 
The negative numbers in the last three columns of the first rows of the two 
panels in table 8.6 reveal that, for an asset located in Japan, the U.S. saver 
faced  the  heaviest  tax  burden,  especially  on  debt  instruments.  The 
corresponding numbers in table 8.7 show that this was also the case for an 
asset located in the United States. Therefore, if higher after-tax returns raise 
savings,  the  tax  systems  harmed  the  relative  savings  performance  of  the 
United States.31 Accordingly,  in addition to investment incentives,  savings 
incentives may also have encouraged U.S. capital inflows. 
Except for an increase in the relatively  favorable  tax treatment of equity 
income earned by Japanese  savers in  1987, international differences in tax 
incentives for savings fell during the  1980s. Two main  factors explain the 
increasing harmonization of tax incentives.  First,  falling inflation rates  and 
nominal interest rates tended to reduce the absolute value of the tax wedges. 
Second, as regards  debt  financing,  the  United  States  reduced  its  personal 
income tax rates during this period.32 
8.5.2  Global Welfare Effects 
This subsection uses the calculated tax wedges to assess how capital income 
taxation  may have influenced  the international allocation of savings and in- 
vestment  as well  as the intertemporal  allocation  of  resources  between  the 
present and the future. 
International Allocation of Investment and Saving 
The results contained in table 8.8 and discussed above in subsection 8.5.1 
revealed  that taxes favored investment in the United  States over investment 
in  Japan.  In  the  absence  of  externalities,  these  differential  investment 
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capital stock. In  particular, the relatively favorable treatment of  investment 
in the United States may have caused the  social benefit of  marginal U.S. 
investment to fall below the marginal productivity of  investment in Japan. 
Consequently, reallocating capital  away  from  the  United  States  to  Japan 
would have raised world welfare. 
The results discussed in subsection 8.5.1 indicated that,  compared with 
Japanese residents, U.S. residents were taxed more heavily on their savings. 
The less favorable tax treatment of U.S. savings may have contributed to an 
inefficient allocation of world savings to the extent that world welfare would 
have risen if the share of U.S. savings in worldwide savings had been larger. 
Developments of  the tax  wedges over time  suggest that  differential tax 
distortions in the international distribution of  savings fell during the 1980s. 
The  potential tax  distortions  in  the  international allocation of  capital,  in 
contrast, rose during 1980-84,  after which they also decreased. 
Intertemporal Allocation  of Resources 
The global intertemporal distortions from capital taxation depend on the 
total tax wedge. The first rows in the second panels of  tables 8.6 and 8.7 
reveal that the total tax wedges levied on marginal equity investments were 
positive. This implies that the net benefits of  a marginal equity investment 
exceeded the social costs associated with financing such an investment, once 
again in the absence of  externalities. Consequently, a marginal increase in 
equity investment would have raised global welfare. 
In contrast to their treatment of  equity investments, tax systems typically 
subsidized marginal  debt investments. The only  marginal  debt investment 
carrying a positive tax wedge was one located in Japan and financed by  a 
U.S. saver. The debt investment enjoying the highest subsidy was one located 
in  the  United  States and  financed by  a Japanese saver. These results are 
explained as follows. The personal-corporate split (second and third rows of 
the  first panels in  tables  8.6 and  8.7) reveals that  debt instruments were 
subsidized at the corporate level but taxed at the personal level. Whereas assets 
located in the United States were more heavily subsidized by the corporate tax 
system, Japanese savers were taxed lightly at the personal level compared to 
savers residing in the United States. Only if  a U.S. saver, who suffered from 
a relatively high personal tax burden, financed an asset located in Japan, which 
enjoyed a relatively small subsidy at the corporate level, was the personal tax 
large enough to offset the subsidy at the corporate level. Thus, a marginal debt 
investment, in the absence of externalities, would improve world welfare only 
if  it were located in Japan and financed by  a U.S. resident. 
The total tax wedges indicate that the absolute values of  net subsidies to 
debt financing for assets located in the United States, after remaining broadly 
constant between  1980 and  1984,  decreased during  the period  1984-87. 
Both  the  falling  expected  inflation  rate  and  the  repeal  of  some  of  the 
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mitigation of these intertemporal distortions. After rising between  1980 and 
1984,  the  net  tax  burdens  on  equity  assets  located  in  Japan  fell  during 
1984-87  to levels close to those in  1980 (table 8.6), which is explained in 
part by  movements  in the corporate tax rate in Japan. Equity assets located 
in the United  States, in contrast, faced increased tax burdens between  1984 
and  1987 after these tax burdens had fallen during 1980-84  (table 8.7). 
8.5.3  National Welfare Effects 
The host-residence split of the tax wedges (fifth and sixth rows of  the two 
panels in tables 8.6 and 8.7) provides  information  on how  marginal cross- 
border investments affect national welfare (see subsec. 8.3.6). The fifth rows 
of  the two panels  in  tables  8.6 and  8.7 indicate  that,  at the  margin, host 
governments subsidized debt investments. On equity investments, in contrast, 
they levied taxes. Thus, host countries tended to  lose from foreign-financed 
debt investments but gained from equity capital inflows. The reason is that host 
countries allow interest expenses to be deducted for corporate tax purposes. 
Consequently,  while the corporate tax  acts as  a withholding  tax  for equity 
income, it fails to withhold interest income on debt. 
The net subsidy granted to debt capital inflows was largest in the United 
States.  Whereas  the  Japanese  subsidy  fell  during  the  1980s, that  in  the 
United  States  rose  during  1980-84.  In  1987, however,  the  U.S.  subsidy 
dropped below its  1980 level. 
8.6  Conclusions 
8.6.1  Some Limitations of the Present Study 
Tax  wedges  were  estimated  separately  for investments  financed  through 
the  issuance  of  either  debt or equity.  While this procedure  covers the two 
extremes,  it  does  not  address  cases  where  the  marginal  investment  is 
financed through a mix of debt and equity, which could change some of the 
results  obtained.  In  particular,  a  greater  preference  for debt  financing  in 
Japan  relative  to the United  States would  reduce  the relative  incentives  to 
invest in the United States. There is, however, considerable uncertainty  as to 
the actual debt-equity mix of the marginal investment in a particular country. 
The  data  are  unavailable,  and,  moreover,  the  ratio  itself  could  vary 
depending on the residence  of  the  saver  financing  the investment. In any 
event,  by  presenting  the  two  extremes,  this  study  provides  sufficient 
information to facilitate the computation  of the tax wedges for any selected 
debt-equity ratio. 
Another  limitation  is  that  the  tax  wedges  were  computed  only  for 
corporate  investments  in  machinery.  The method  developed  in  the  study 
could  be employed for a  more comprehensive assessment  that  would  also 
cover  other  investments,  including  those  in  inventories  and  business 
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concern  the  tax  treatment  of  depreciation,  and  as these  were  substantially 
more generous  in the  United States than  in Japan, particularly  in the early 
1980s, the qualitative ranking of  the savings and investment incentives may 
not change. 
A further limitation is the exclusive focus on corporate investment. Other 
forms  of  capital  flow,  for example,  investment  in  government  securities, 
acquisition  of  real  estate,  and  buyouts  of  companies,  are  of  increasing 
importance.  While a fuller study is needed to account adequately for the role 
of tax factors in influencing these capital flows, the information presented in 
the study permits some inferences for savings through government securities. 
Income from such securities are subject to a host-withholding tax, if  levied, 
and to the residence personal income tax. As the latter is substantially higher 
in the United  States than in Japan, the U.S. saver was taxed more heavily 
than  the  Japanese  saver  irrespective  of  whether  he  invested  in  U.S.  or 
Japanese government  securities.  Also in this case, the tax systems hurt the 
savings  performance  of  the  United  States  relative  to Japan. However,  the 
differences in tax incentives for investing in government securities decreased 
during the  1980s. 
8.6.2 
The tax  wedges  obtained  for Japanese savers  investing  in Japan  can be 
compared with those for U.S. savers investing in the United States, as has 
been done in some studies. Such a comparison may be useful if capital is not 
mobile internationally.  This appears to have been characteristic of Japanese 
capital markets before a major liberalization occurred in the early 1980s. As 
was  noted  in  section  8.2, in  a  relatively  closed  capital  market,  the 
composition  of  the  tax  wedge needs to be known  in  order to establish  tax 
effects on real interest rates. Larger corporate tax factors and lower personal 
tax  factors  in  Japan  relative  to  those  in  the  United  States  may  have 
contributed to a lower Japanese real  interest rate level, although the actual 
outcome  for domestic  interest rates  may  also  have been  affected  by  other 
demands  for  credit,  especially  from  the  public  sector.  As  figure  8.9 
demonstrates,  the  general  government  fiscal  deficit  was  fairly  sizable  in 
Japan up to about 1981 but declined substantially thereafter. Over the same 
period,  real  interest  rate  levels  in  Japan,  which  in  the  years  immediately 
preceding were higher, fell below  those in the United States (fig.  8.10). If 
the Japanese capital market had not been liberalized in the early 1980s, the 
growing Japanese  savings  surpluses would have been bottled up within  the 
domestic economy. Accordingly, the equilibrating  responses may  well have 
involved greater deflation, with Japanese real interest rates declining further. 
However,  the  major  liberalization  of  Japanese  capital  markets  provided  a 
vent for the excess savings by allowing more capital outflows. 
Over this  period, developments  in  the  United  States  accommodated  the 
growing  Japanese  savings  surpluses.  The U.S.  fiscal  balance  moved  into 
persistent  and  substantial  deficit  (see fig. 8.11). If  the international  capital 
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Fig. 8.9  Fiscal balance, private savings, and investment patterns in Japan, 
1975-87  (in percentage of GNP) 
Source; OECD, National Accounts,  and staff calculations. 
I  Private savings defined as the sum of household and corporate savings. 
market had  not become more integrated and resources from abroad had not 
become  available,  ensuing  adjustments  would  most  likely  have  added  to 
inflationary  pressures  in  the  United  States,  accompanied  by  rising  real 
interest  rates  crowding  out  investment  in  the  United  States  in  a  manner 
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Fig. 8.11  Fiscal balance, private savings, and investment patterns in the 
United States, 1975-87  (in percentage of  GNP) 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. 
I  Private savings defined as the sum of  household and corporate savings. 
investment was also avoided by the more liberal U.S. investment incentives 
introduced in  1981, which prevented higher real interest rates from harming 
investment. 
Without  a  detailed  econometric  study,  it  is  difficult  to  assess  the 
contribution of  tax factors to capital flows, although some broad inferences 
can be drawn. In 1982, the net outflow of  private capital from the United 
States was reversed (table 8.1). At the same time, a positive real interest 
differential in favor of  the United States emerged (fig. 8.  lo), and the value 
of  the  U.S.  dollar  rose.  These  phenomena  are  consistent  with  more 
generous tax  incentives for investment in  the United States between  1981 
and  1984 (table 8.8).  These incentives put  upward  pressure on the U.S. 
interest rates, thereby attracting foreign capital and raising the value of  the 
dollar.  It  is,  perhaps,  no  coincidence that  the  sharp  decline  in  the  tax 
differential favoring investment in  the United States in  1986 is associated 
with  a  major  reduction  in  net  private  capital  inflows  in  1987,  forcing 
official intervention to  finance a  much  larger share of  the  U.S.  current 
account deficit, a narrowing of  the real interest differential, and downward 
pressure on the U.S. dollar. 
8.6.3  The Role of Tax Coordination 
It is interesting to inquire, in the context of  the study’s findings, whether 
the  systems  of  capital  income  taxes  were  adequately  coordinated.  A 
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the accumulation  and allocation  of capital. In an international  context, this 
requires that before-tax marginal products on capital and after-tax returns on 
savings are equalized  across countries. It is a short but  contentious  step to 
conclude from this that tax systems in different countries  should, therefore, 
be harmonized.  In the context of this study, complete harmonization  occurs 
if the different tax wedges are equalized  so that the tax incentives provided 
are the same for savers and investors in different countries. 
However,  in  practice,  complete  tax  harmonization  is  elusive,  and  an 
attempt  to  enforce  it  may  well  reduce  welfare.  A  greater  concern  with 
environmental  issues or different  perceptions  of  national  contingencies  and 
other externalities may lead to diverse needs for the accumulation of capital 
and  its  allocation. Intercountry  differences  in  capital  income  taxes  may, 
therefore,  be necessary to accommodate such needs. There is, nevertheless, 
a role for tax coordination  in order to ensure that the interaction of  national 
tax  policies  does  not  unduly  damage global efficiency.  In  particular,  tax 
systems,  and  the  interactions  among  them,  should  not  excessively  bias 
savings  and  investment  incentives  in  favor  of  any  one  country,  thereby 
misallocating capital. However, the complex considerations involved suggest 
that circumspection  should be used in determining what is an “excessive” 
bias. 
The more generous investment incentives introduced by the United States 
in  1981 may  have  acted to offset  the adverse  effects on investment  of  the 
sharp rise in real interest rates. Nevertheless, the reduction in capital income 
taxes contributed to the decline in income tax collections  from 12.9 percent 
of GDP in  1980 to 9.8 percent in  1986, more than matching the increase in 
the general government fiscal deficit from 1.3  percent of GDP to 3.4 percent 
of GDP over the same period.  To  the extent that the persistent  fiscal deficit 
preempts  a  significant  part of  the world’s  pool  of  savings  and  keeps real 
interest rates high, a vicious circle is generated: cuts in capital income taxes 
are required  to offset  the  adverse effects on the  cost  of  capital  from their 
deficit-enhancing effects. In increasingly integrated world financial markets, 
such a policy generates a widening imbalance between domestic savings and 
investment, resulting  in large capital  inflows  and shifts in exchange rates. 
Moreover, the required subsidies to investments tend to be inconsistent with 
the requirements  for global and national efficiency.  An alternative policy of 
maintaining  1980  tax  levels  could  have  lowered  the  fiscal  deficit  and 
lessened  the  upward  pressures  on real  interest  rates.  Such a policy  would 
have protected  private  investment  without  having  to rely  on capital  inflows 
and investment  subsidies that  were distorting the international  allocation  of 
capital. Some adjustment  at  the  margin  in  the  early  1980s, involving  an 
increase  in  savings  incentives  for  residents  of  the  United  States  and  a 
decrease  in  the  fiscal  deficit,  financed  by  a  reduction  in  the  generous 
investment incentives through increases in corporate taxation (as occurred in 
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A critical consideration is that, as economies become more integrated, the 
alleviating role of purely  domestic  adjustment  mechanisms  is reduced,  for 
example,  through  the  effect  of  imbalances  on  domestic  interest  rates. 
Consequently,  the  distortionary  effects  of  taxes  on  global  and  national 
welfare as well as on international capital flows become more pronounced. If 
these  distortions  are  to  be  mitigated,  policymakers  must  pay  increasing 
attention to the international implications of their domestic tax policies. 
Appendix 
Derivation of  the Tax Wedges 
This appendix describes how one can derive the real rates of return and the 
tax wedges introduced in section 8.3 from expected inflation rates, nominal 
interest  rates  (for a  debt  instrument),  and  nominal  equity  returns  (for an 
equity instrument). 
Tables  8A.1  and  8A.2  present  these  tax  wedges  for  a  debt-  and 
equity-financed  investment,  respectively.  Table  8A.3 defines  the  different 
variables and lists the tax parameters required to find the wedges presented in 
tables 8A.  1 and 8A.2.33  A variable marked with an asterisk refers to the host 
country. A variable without an asterisk relates to the residence country.34 
The real market rate of return r*, which is contained in the first row of the 
tables,  is the return  that  is earned  after all corporate  taxes but  before  any 
personal  tax. The second row in the tables presents the real cost of  finance 
r?.  Investors (usually the firm) adopt this rate as the discount rate at which 
they  compare  all  receipts  and  outlays  (after  corporate  tax)  occumng  at 
different  points  in  time.  The  nominal  after-tax  cost  to  debt  finance  is 
i*( 1 -  uf’),  where uf’  is the effective (corporate) tax rate at which the investor 
can deduct interest payments in calculating taxable income. In the absence of 
a split rate system (i.e., u:  = ui), the real  cost of  equity finance is simply 
the market return on equity because,  in contrast to interest payments, equity 
returns are not deductible from taxable income. 
The cost of capital p*, given in the third row of the tables, is the required 
real  rate  of  return  before  corporate  income  taxes  are  levied  and  tax 
allowances are granted.  The expression for p* is derived from the equality 
between the marginal benefit and the marginal cost on an investment project: 
(1 - u;)(p* + 6*) = (1 -  A*) (r-  + 6*). 
Here,  6* is the exponential rate of  economic depreciation.  The left-hand 
side of (Al)  corresponds to the revenues after corporate income tax has been 
levied on the user cost of capital p* + 6* at an effective rate of u;.35 For a 
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of holding capital, which are represented by the right-hand side of (Al). These 
costs amount to the after-tax cost of a unit of investment (1  -A*) times the 
sum of the after-tax financing costs rf*  and the costs of depreciation. 
Following King and Fullerton (1984, 19), A* denotes the present value of 
investment  grants  and  depreciation  allowances  on  a  project  with  a  cost 
(before tax allowances) of unity. This parameter reduces the after-tax cost of 
a unit of capital. The fourth row in the tables shows that this paper accounts 
for three forms of grants and allowances: standard depreciation allowances, 
immediate expensing (or free depreciation) and cash grants. 
The fifth row contains the corporate tax wedge t:. This gap between  the 
cost  of  capital  and  the  market  return  corresponds  to the  “investment  tax 
wedge”  in Sorenson (1987), Sinn (1987), and Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz 
(1984, 1987).36  These papers use the investment tax wedge as a measure for 
the incentive to invest in a small open economy  that  takes the real  market 
return r*  as given.37 
The sixth  and  seventh  rows  in  the tables  contain, respectively,  the  real 
return  after  withholding  taxes  r:  and  the  withholding  tax  wedge  t:.  The 
withholding  tax  wedge  on  dividends  includes  the  effects  of  provisions  to 
mitigate the double taxation of  dividends, such as a split rate or imputation 
system.  Withholding  taxes  on  dividend  income  influence  investment 
incentives  only  if  the  firm  uses  new  share  issues  to  finance  marginal 
investment (see table 8A.2).38 
The eighth row in the tables aggregates the tax wedges for all host taxes. 
This  host  tax  wedge  ti is  important  in  determining  the  national  welfare 
effects associated with capital taxation  because it corresponds to the wedge 
between the social return on capital, which at the margin is equal to the cost 
of capital p*, and the cost of capital to the host country as a whole,  r:. 
The after-tax return,  which  is presented  in  the  ninth  row  in  the  tables, 
affects the  incentive to save. The total tax wedge, contained  in the twelfth 
row,  reflects  the  total  effect  of  the  tax  system  on  these  incentives.  This 
wedge  is  important  in  determining  the  worldwide  intertemporal  efficiency 
costs resulting  from capital  taxation.  It corresponds  to the  wedge between 
the social return  on marginal investment p*  and the  social costs associated 
with the financing of such an investment s. 
The residence tax factor for debt instruments, contained in the tenth row in 
table  8A.1,  depends  on  how  the  residence  country  credits  foreign  with- 
holding  taxes  on  dividend  and  interest  income. The parameters  8,  and  8, 
summarize  these  crediting  arrangements  for,  respectively,  dividend  and 
interest income. Relative  expected  inflation  rates  may  affect  the  residence 
tax burden imposed on domestic debt instruments relative to that imposed on 
foreign  debt  if  the  tax  rate  on  interest  income  exceeds  the  tax  rate  on 
exchange rate gains and losses.39 In that case, the residence tax burden on 
domestic debt relative to that on foreign debt generally rises if the expected 
domestic  inflation  rate  increases  relative  to  the  expected  foreign  rate  of 
inflati~n.~’ Table 8A.1  Tax Wedges and Rates of Return: Debt Financing 
Real Rate of Return 
or Tax Wedge  Symbol  Derivation  Expression 
(1)  Market return 
(2) Discount rate investor 
(3) Cost of capital 
(4) Effective subsidy on capital goods 
(5)  Corporate tax wedge 
(6) Return after withholding tax 
(7) Withholding tax wedge 
(8) Host tax wedge 
(9) Retum after tax 
(10) Residence tax wedge 
(1  1) Personal tax wedge 




j* -  P* 
(1 - uiJ  i* - P* 
(1 -  A*) 
[(l  .-  up* - P*  + 6*] - 6* 
(1 -  u;l 
(1 - w:)i* - P* 
w:i* 
(1 -  m,)O,(l - w:)i* - (1 - z)n* -  ZP 
[I -  rn,)Oi](1 - w:)i* + z(n - n*) 
[I -  (1 -  mi)O,(l -  wf)]i*  + z(a - a*) 
+ y-](P*  -  6*) + Z(P - P*) 
Source: Authors'  calculations. Table 8A.2  Tax Wedges and Rates of Return: Equity Financing 
Real Rate of  Return or Tax  Wedge  Symbol  Derivation  Expression 
(1) Market return 
(2) Discount rate investor 
(3) Cost of capital 
(4) Effective subsidy on capital goods 
(5)  Corporate tax wedge 
(6)  Return after withholding tax 
(7) Withholding tax wedge 
(8) Host tax wedge 
(9)  Return after tax 
(10) Residence tax  wedge 
(1  1) Personal tax wedge 
(12) Total tax wedge 
p* -  P* 
(p* - a*)[1 - €*(U; -  u31 
(1 -  A*) (p* - n*)[1 - €*(u; -  u:)]  + 6* - 6* 
(1 - u;r 
u; -  A*  (p* + 6* - a*) -  €*(U; - u:) 7  (1 -  A*l (p* - a*) 
(1 - Ut) 
(I -  €*w;)(p*  - a*) 
€*W&)*  - a*) 
(1 -  A*) 
- €*(u; - u:) ___  (P* - a*) 
(I - u;1 
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Table 8A.3  Definition of Parameters 
Description 

















Effective income tax rate at which investors can deduct interest expenses. 
Effective corporate income tax rate at which retained corporate income is taxed. 
Effective corporate tax rate at which dividends are taxed. 
Effective rate of subsidy on capital goods (includes effect of tax credits and 
Effective corporate income tax rates at which investors can deduct depreciation 
The present value of standard depreciation allowances on a unit of investment. 
The portion of  the cost of an asset that is entitled to standard depreciation 
The portion of the cost of an asset that qualifies for immediate expensing. 
The portion of the cost of an asset that qualifies for an investment grant. 
The rate of investment grant. 
Withholding tax rate on nominal interest income. 
Withholding tax rate on dividend income (includes effect of double taxation relief 
for corporate tax). 
Personal tax rate on nominal interest income. 
Personal tax rate on dividend income. 
Parameter representing relief at personal level for foreign withholding taxes on 






withholding taxes on dividends. 
z 
c 
Personal tax rate on exchange rate gains and losses. 
Personal tax rate on nominal capital gains (excluding exchange rate gains and 
losses). Other symbols: 
&* 
share issues). 
6*  Rate of economic depreciation. 




Fraction of real earnings on equity paid as dividends (or fraction financed by new 
Nominal return on equity before personal tax. 
Expected inflation rate, host country. 
Expected inflation rate, residence country. 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
Notes 
1.  Auerbach  (1983)  and  Boadway  (1985)  provide  excellent  surveys  of  the 
literature in this area. 
2.  Alternatively, the effective marginal tax rate, found by  dividing the tax wedge 
by the before-tax rate of return p,  can describe the effects of  capital income taxation. 320  A.  L.  BovenbergIK.  AnderssodK. AramakilS.  K.  Chand 
3. Thus, the investment demand curve is in flow terms rather than in stock terms 
because this section focuses on the short-term equilibrium. These flow demands are 
derived  from  a  model  with  adjustment  costs,  which  prevent  instantaneous  stock 
adjustment. Alternatively, one could model the long-term capital market equilibrium 
in stock terms. In that case, a lower p  would raise the stock demand for capital. This 
would imply a higher rate of  net investment during the transition,  assuming rising 
short-run adjustment costs. 
4.  Results below indicate that  in  some cases the  tax  wedge is negative.  In  that 
case, the government subsidizes marginal investments. 
5.  Thus, the social costs of postponing consumption equal the private costs. This 
assumes that private saving does not generate any externalities, which requires that 
the government can attdn the first-best growth path by transferring income between 
generations in a lump-sum fashion. 
6.  This assumes  that the government  can use  nondistortionary  taxes,  such  as a 
lump-sum tax. Otherwise, the social value of one marginal unit of tax revenue may 
exceed unity. 
7.  This assumes that assets are perfect substitutes.  Moreover, corporate taxes are 
assumed  to  be  levied  on  a  source  basis,  while  the  residence  principle  governs 
personal taxation. Subsection 8.3.2 explains and elaborates on these assumptions and 
relaxes some of them. 
8.  Over time, the current account deficit may fall as the investment and savings 
schedules shift in response to the accumulation of capital and wealth. 
9.  This  assumes  that  the  host  country  collects  all  corporate  taxes,  while  the 
residence  country  collects  all  personal  taxes.  Accordingly,  withholding  taxes  on 
personal income are assumed to be zero. Subsection 8.3.6 discusses and relaxes some 
of these assumptions. 
10. Only  if  tax  wedges  do  not  affect  the  market  return  in  a  closed  economy 
would the welfare costs  in  a closed economy equal  those  in  an open economy. In 
all  other  cases,  the  welfare  costs  in  an  open  economy  exceed  those  costs  in  a 
closed economy. 
1  1. If  savings are elastic with respect to the after-tax rate of return, capital income 
taxation  affects  the  global  capital  stock  and,  therefore,  global  intertemporal 
efficiency. In  the  absence  of  externalities,  the  total  tax  wedges  measure  the  gap 
between the social benefits of a marginal investment and the social costs of financing 
it  by  a  marginal  unit  of  saving  (see  subsec.  8.2.2).  Accordingly,  they  provide 
information on how marginal changes in the world capital stock affect global welfare. 
12. Under  a  temtorial  system,  the  residence  country  exempts  foreign-source 
income from corporate taxation. Under a system of worldwide taxation, the residence 
country  taxes  global  income  but  credits  foreign  corporate  taxes  against  domestic 
corporate tax liabilities as long as foreign corporate taxes do not exceed the domestic 
corporate tax liabilities calculated on the foreign-source income. 
13. Differential  opportunities  for  tax  evasion  are  a  fourth  reason  why  the 
residence principle may fail.  Savers may find it  easier to evade residence taxes on 
foreign assets than corresponding taxes on domestic assets. 
14. Another  important  case  is  savings  channeled  through  banks  because 
withholding  taxes  are  imposed  on  gross  interest  income  so  that  no  deduction  is 
allowed for interest expense and other costs of  making  the  loan.  The withholding 
taxes, therefore,  often exceed  the residence  tax  liability on net  income from  bank 
loans. 
15. Accordingly,  this  study does not  assume that  savers necessarily  require the 
same after-tax rate of return s  on assets located in different countries. Thus, s$ is not 
necessarily equal to sf: in fig. 8.7. 321  Tax Incentives and International Capital Flows 
16. Tax wedges provide an unambiguous indicator of the effect of the tax system 
on investment incentives only if the tax wedge on assets located in country A exceeds 
that on assets located in B for all savers, i.e., both those residing in A and those in B. 
17. This discussion of national welfare effects abstracts from optimal tariff type 
arguments by  assuming that countries lack market power to affect the cost of  funds 
on  world  markets.  For  an  application  of  such  arguments  to  international  capital 
taxation,  see Sinn (1987, chap. 7) and Gordon and Varian (1987). Furthermore, the 
study does not deal with strategic considerations, which would become relevant if  the 
tax system in one country were perceived to affect tax policy in another country. 
18. For a marginal investment financed by  domestic savings, the total tax wedge 
represents  the  gap  between  national  benefits  and  costs.  For  the  assumptions 
underlying  this  approach,  see  subsec.  8.2.2  and,  in  particular,  the  notes  in  that 
subsection.  It  is  assumed,  for  example,  that  the  government  can  raise  revenue 
through nondistortionary taxes. 
19. This paper assumes that firms do not finance their investments  with foreign 
currency bonds. 
20.  Projects located in the same country are assumed to pay both a unique nominal 
interest rate on debt and a unique nominal after-corporate-tax return on equity. 
21.  Thus, perfect foresight is assumed. The inflation rates in  1988 and  1989 are 
taken from the projections contained in the World Economic Outlook of April 1988. 
22.  Tax  wedges  were  calculated  by  using  observed  rather  than  uniform  nontax 
parameters  in  order  to  capture  the  interaction  between  tax  provisions  and  the 
macroeconomic environment.  However, to examine the sensitivity of  the results to 
the  values  of  nominal  interest  and  inflation rates,  we  also  computed  tax  wedges 
assuming  a  constant  nominal  interest  rate  of  8  percent  and  a  constant  expected 
inflation rate of  4 percent  across countries  and over time.  The  sensitivity analysis 
revealed that  the  development  of  the  relative  tax  wedges  was  very  similar  to  the 
results presented in this paper. 
23.  This construction typically opens up arbitrage opportunities at the savers (or 
household) level and requires imperfect substitution at the household level between 
debt and equity. 
24.  According to the estimates in Hatsopoulos and Brooks (1987) and Ando and 
Auerbach (1987), the gap between the cost of equity and debt financing was larger in 
the United States. The current study assumes that the gap is the same in the United States 
and Japan in order to identify how international differences in tax factors, as opposed 
to differences in the structure of financial intermediation, affect investment incentives. 
25.  Some studies allow for an exogenous risk premium on equity. See, e.g., Feld- 
stein (1986). Others measure the return on equity directly by using the inverse of the 
observed price-eamings ratio on shares. See, e.g., Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz (1987). 
26.  Even in a closed economy, the tax burden on debt relative to equity can differ 
among individuals  with different marginal tax rates.  Moreover,  imposing  arbitrage 
conditions on the  savers’ side is problematic  even in a closed economy because it 
generally  implies that  a given  piece  of  capital  earns a different  before-tax  rate of 
return  depending  on  how  it  is  financed  (see,  e.g.,  Bradford  and  Stuart  1984). 
Therefore, the firm can typically obtain arbitrage profits by  specializing in the least 
expensive type of financing. 
Alternatively, one can use the  arbitrage condition  for only one particular saver. 
Sinn (1987), e.g., imposes the arbitrage condition only for savers in the host country 
because he assumes that debt accounts for all international portfolio capital flows and 
that all equity is held domestically. As an alternative procedure,  Alworth and Fritz 
(1988)  average  the  arbitrage  conditions  for  all  savers to  arrive  at  one  “world” 
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27.  Interest income from small deposits (Ma-yu  accounts) with banks and other 
financial  institutions  was  tax  exempt  if  the  total  amount  of  principal  did  not 
exceed  Y3  million.  Tax-exempt  savings  included  holdings  of  central  and  local 
government  bonds,  not  exceeding  Y  3  million  in  total  face  value  (special 
“Maru-yu”),  postal  savings  not  exceeding  T 3  million,  and  savings  under  the 
Employees’ Asset Formation System not exceeding T 5 million.  Those tax-exempt 
savings accounted  for  about  70  percent  of  the  total  balance  of  personal  savings. 
From April  1988, the tax-exempt systems for Maru-yu, special Maru-yu, and postal 
savings were  abolished,  and  earnings  on  these  savings  are  now  subject  to  a  20 
percent final tax at source. 
28.  Thus,  if  savers  channel  the  funds  through  a  financial  intermediary,  the 
intermediary  is  assumed  to  have  sufficient  tax  liabilities  against  which  to  credit 
withholding taxes. 
29.  This effect of inflation dominates the negative effect of inflation on the present 
value of depreciation allowances. 
30.  The negative numbers in the third row of the first panel in table  8.8 reveal 
this. The relatively favorable personal tax treatment of assets located in Japan implies 
that relative corporate tax wedges overestimated the tax incentives for investment in 
assets located in the United States. 
31.  If  assets are not close substitutes in portfolios and savers residing in different 
countries have different preferences  for assets, this result  may  no longer hold.  To 
illustrate, if  savers prefer assets located domestically, the higher corporate tax burden 
on  assets  located  in  Japan  may  have  offset  the  positive  incentive  effects  of  the 
favorable personal tax treatment of  Japanese savers. In fact, for both equity and debt 
financing,  the  Japanese  government  taxed  locally  financed  Japanese  assets  more 
heavily than the U.S. government taxed local assets. Thus, in the extreme case of 
savers holding only domestic assets, which is equivalent to a closed economy without 
any  international capital flows, Japanese savers were taxed more heavily than  U.S. 
savers. This result  illustrates the  important  role  of  more open  international  capital 
markets in changing the tax incentives for savings and investment behavior. For an 
analysis within a closed economy, see Shoven and Tachibanaki (1985) and Makin and 
Shoven (1987). 
32.  Following the period of analysis, Japan raised its tax rate on interest income in 
1988. 
33.  In  principle,  computing  the effective  tax  rate  requires  expected  rather than 
actual tax parameters. This study, however, uses actual tax provisions to approximate 
the anticipated provisions. 
34.  If  a  saver  finances  an  investment  located  in  his  or  her  own  country,  the 
residence and host countries coincide. 
35.  It is assumed that corporate taxes are not credited in the residence country (see 
subsec. 8.3.1). 
36.  The  corporate  tax  wedge  does  not  depend  on  whether  the  investment  is 
financed by  domestic  or  foreign  savers.  In  Sinn  (1987),  the  corporate  tax  wedge 
depends on the tax treatment of interest and equity income at the personal level in the 
host country. This is because Sinn (1987) assumes that domestic equity  finances a 
fixed  part  of  domestic  investment  and  that  domestic  households  earn  the  same 
after-tax return on equity and debt. 
37.  For a critical evaluation of this approach,  see subsec. 8.3.2. 
38.  The expressions in table 8A.2 assume that the real return on new share issues 
is paid in dividends. The purely nominal inflationary gain is reflected in capital gains. 
This is similar to the procedure in Feldstein (1986) and Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz 
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Sinn (1987) argues, along the lines of the “new”  view of dividend taxation,  that 
investors  generally  adopt  profit  retentions  rather  than  new  share  issues  as  the 
marginal source of equity finance. In that case, dividend taxes, including withholding 
taxes on dividends, fail to distort investment decisions and amount to a lump-sum tax 
on existing rather than a tax on new capital.  Dividend taxes affect new investment 
only when dividends are not paid; in that case, internal investment absorbs all profits, 
and investors  are forced to generate  new equity  capital through  new  share  issues. 
Hartman  (1985)  uses  similar  arguments  to  argue  that  home  taxation  of  direct 
investment  is  largely  irrelevant  for direct  investment  decisions  in  the  presence of 
deferral provisions. 
39.  The tax rate on exchange rate gains  is generally lower than the tax rate on 
interest  income because  it is the rate  on  accrued  gains  and  losses  rather than  the 
statutory rate on realized gains. Moreover, countries often set the tax rate on capital 
gains,  including  exchange  rate  gains,  at a  rather  low level  in order  to  encourage 
investors  to  trade  their  assets  and  realize  their  capital  gains  so as  to avoid large 
efficiency losses and, in some cases, revenue loses. 
40.  The paper assumes that savers expect nominal exchange rates to adjust fully 
for  the  effects  of  intercountry  differences  in  expected  inflation  rates.  See  also 
Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz (1984) and Gordon (1986). 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
This  paper  represents a  first  attempt to  introduce an  important  element of 
international  taxation to the international tax comparison “industry.” In the past, 
authors have followed the lead of King and Fullerton (1984) in calculating the 
marginal tax rates for domestically financed business investment for different 
countries and then comparing these results across countries. Absent international 
capital flows, such comparisons would tell us about the relative tax distortions 
confronting capital  formation and  saving  in  each  country, with  the  saving- 
investment identity making further distinctions meaningless. 
However,  such flows are not  absent.  If  domestic saving and  investment 
can move independently  (they can, though the controversy continues about 
how much they do), what do these overall wedges tell us? Not necessarily 
very much. For example, a large wedge in the United States could primarily 
discourage domestic investment or domestic saving, depending on how the 
tax was  assessed. The incidence and efficiency effects would  turn on this 
question, as would the direction of induced capital flows. Indeed, if marginal 
funds for U.S. investment come from Japan, for example, then the “right” 
overall  wedge  for  U.S. capital  formation  is  the  one  that  combines  the 
investment  wedge  at  home  with  the  saving  wedge  in  Japan.  Even  that 
approach is too simple, however,  because one cannot generally distinguish 
separate saving and investment wedges. Japanese savers face different rates 
of tax on foreign and domestic assets,  so we must look at each individual 
saving-investment country combination to obtain a complete description  of 
the relevant tax incentives. 
This  is  what  the  paper  does  admirably  well,  for  a  particular  class  of 
investments.  It  leaves  open  the  question  of  the  equilibrium  that  these 
distortions generate and the extent to which they are even compatible with 
capital market equilibrium in the absence of  imperfect capital flows or asset 
substitutability.  In  considering  only  portfolio  investment,  it  produces  the 
most straightforward extension of the previous closed economy analysis but 
leaves aside the empirically more significant and conceptually more complex 
categories  of  foreign  direct  investment  and  investment  by  financial 
intermediaries.  We  learn  from  table  8.2  that  such  portfolio  investment 
represented  20  percent  of  U.S.  investment  abroad  during  the  period 
1980-87  and 31 percent of  foreign investment in the United States. Further 
whittling down these numbers to account for the fact that only one type of 
ultimate capital purchase, machinery and equipment, is considered, one finds 
that this paper’s calculations apply to roughly 20 percent of foreign private 
investment  in  the  United  States  during  the  period  1980-87  and,  if  one 
Alan J. Auerbach is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania and a research 
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assumes  the  same  investment  breakdown  elsewhere,  13 percent  of  U.S. 
private investment abroad. 
While the authors do make certain conjectures about how other assets and 
forms  of  investment  might  be  affected,  one  must  be  fairly  cautious  in 
drawing, one might say, global inferences based on the paper’s results. Still, 
there  is  much  of  interest  here.  Before  performing  their  tax  wedge 
calculations,  Bovenberg et al. must confront several methodological  issues, 
most  of  which  also  arose  in  the  original  King-Fullerton  international 
comparisons. These questions do not have simple answers, but little space is 
devoted  to  the  choices  made,  even  when  they  diverge  from  previous 
approaches. This is primarily a relatively  painful collection of index-number 
problems the details of which the reader might be grateful to be spared, but 
a brief discussion is worthwhile. 
The key problem is how to determine the rate of return to use as a base for 
each calculation.  This leads to problems within each country and problems 
in comparing the two countries. 
Unless a tax system taxes true economic income, the effective tax rate will 
depend on the rate of return assumed, either before tax  or after tax.  Even 
when the effective tax rate is invariant with respect to the assumed rate of 
return,  the  tax  wedge  (i.e.,  the  numerator  of  the  effective  tax  rate 
calculation) will almost surely increase with the assumed rate of return since 
part  of  the tax wedge  is associated  with the tax rate applied to gross cash 
flows. Thus, the choice of rate of return influences the estimated tax wedge. 
One cannot  assume  that  all  rates  of  return,  before  tax  and  after  tax,  are 
equal, of  course, but one can assume that all before-tax rates are equal, all 
after-tax rates are equal, or all real interest rates are equal, corresponding to 
the  King-Fullerton  fixed-p,  fixed-s,  and  fixed-r cases. In my view,  any of 
these would be preferable to the use of observed rates of return in the United 
States and Japan. Under the current methodology, it would  be possible for 
the two countries to have identical tax systems and even identical inflation 
experience  and  yet  have  systematic  tax  wedge  differences  owing to  real 
interest  rate  differentials.  Surely  one would  not  wish  to  base  conclusions 
about tax policy differences on such results. 
Likewise,  I do not see the merit  in assuming a differential rate of return 
between debt and equity, It is true that the after-tax return of equity exceeds 
that of debt, but this is due to risk, a factor not considered in this paper or, to 
be  fair,  in  most  previous  efforts  either.  As  has  been  developed  in  the 
literature on risky asset taxation (Auerbach 1983; Bulow and Summers 1984; 
Gordon  and Wilson  1989), one cannot treat  an asset with  a high expected 
risky return like one with a high safe return when calculating the asset’s tax 
burden. If assets are to be assumed free of risk, one might as well ignore the 
risk premia that they actually carry. 
A final comment in this vein is that, if  one uses ARIMA forecasts of the 
inflation  rate for Japan, consistency  would dictate doing so for the  United 
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Let me turn now to the empirical calculations that are the paper’s primary 
contribution.  There are many parameter  assumptions  necessary  to perform 
these calculations.  While one can quarrel with particular  choices,  I  do not 
see anything unreasonable in them. The results indicate that Japan has taxed 
investment more heavily  and saving less heavily  than  the  United  States, a 
result  not  unexpected  given  the  previous  closed  economy  calculations  of 
corporate  and  investor  tax  wedges  reported  by  Shoven  and  Tachibanaki 
(1988). We also learn, from the last three columns of table 8.8, that the lack 
of  formal separability of savings-tax and investment-tax wedges is relatively 
unimportant: the gap between total tax wedges faced by U.S. and Japanese 
savers depends very little on where they  are assumed to be investing.  This 
could be the result of complete foreign tax crediting but seems here to be due 
more directly to the unimportance  of host country taxes on investor income. 
It is hard to tell whether this result would also hold for the more complicated 
ownership patterns  excluded from consideration in the paper. 
We learn from the last three columns of tables 8.6  and 8.7 that the relative 
tax advantage of savers in Japan has declined over the past decade and from 
the first six columns of table 8.8 that the relative tax advantage of investment 
in  the  United  States  rose  in  the  early  1980s and  fell  in  the  late  1980s, 
presumably  as the result of the important tax acts of  1981 and  1986. These 
results suggest that the  saving-investment imbalance  that has characterized 
the  two  countries’  bilateral  relations  may  in  part  have  been  due  to  tax 
policies  and  that  recent  policy  changes  ought  to  have  lessened  these 
imbalances.  But, to go further in macroeconomic  and welfare analysis,  we 
need not only prices but quantities. 
Here,  the  paper  becomes  less  specific,  talking  generally  about  the 
theoretical  welfare and  macroeconomic  effects but  not using the empirical 
estimates to apply the theory. One could extend the theory a little bit further, 
by  noting,  for example, that  the  deadweight  cost due to the  distortion  of 
international  capital  allocation  when  saving  is  not  fixed  would  be 
approximately -  ‘/2 2.  (pi -  sij)Kij,  where Ki,j  is the capital of type i held by 
savers  of  type j,  and  that  the relevant  saving  elasticity  would  be  a comp- 
ensated  one  that  would  always  be  positive.  It  would  also  be  useful  to 
flesh out the conditions under which international asset specialization would 
occur. 
But to do much more welfare analysis than this, one would need a more 
explicit model of  international capital flows, one that would account for the 
imperfect substitutability that  seems present in these asset markets  and the 
more  complicated  tax  rules  that  apply  to  foreign  direct  investment  and 
financial intermediaries.  This paper has brought  us well beyond the closed 
economy effective tax rate calculations of the past but shares with previous 
efforts a focus on the level and dispersion of relative tax rates rather than on 
the  fuller  story  including  a  characterization  of  the  associated  quantity 
adjustments and their welfare and macroeconomic consequences.  This is not 
to deny the progress that the authors have made, only to point out the next 
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important step in this line of  research. This next step is perhaps even more 
important in the open economy context; with several alternative  ownership 
structures  available  for  any  given  underlying  real  transaction,  tax  rate 
dispersion  need  not  be  a  good  indicator of  the  extent  to  which  capital 
allocation is distorted, and “representative”  overall effective tax  rates  are 
hard to come by. 
References 
Auerbach, Alan J.  1983. Corporate taxation in the United States. Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity 2:45 1 -  505. 
Bulow, Jeremy I., and Lawrence H. Summers,  1984. The taxation of  risky assets. 
Journal of Political Economy (February), 20-34. 
Gordon,  Roger H., and  John D.  Wilson.  1989. Measuring  the  efficiency  cost  of 
taxing risky capital income. American Economic Review (June), 427-39. 
King, Mervyn, and Don Fullerton, eds.  1984. The taxation of  income from capital. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Shoven,  John B., and  Toshiaki Tachibanaki.  1988.  The  taxation of  income  from 
capital in Japan. In Government policy towards industry in the  United States and 
Japan, ed. John B. Shoven. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 